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Abstract
The purpose of this note is to update an ancient controversy over the com-
parison between discrete and continuous agent models of land use and agent
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owns or is endowed with a positive Lebesgue measure of land. A corollary
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You just asked me, when will it end?
Hahahahaha, well let me tell you
Once an evil deed is done, then it never ends
It goes on, and it will go on forever... (Wu Tang Clan, Evil Deeds,Wu
Tang Chamber Music)
1 Introduction
The purpose of this note is to update an ancient controversy over the comparison
between discrete and continuous agent models of land use and agent location in urban
economics. Berliant (1985), which is mathematically trivial, shows that the following
statement is self-contradictory: There is a continuum of agents, each of whom owns
or is endowed with a parcel of positive Lebesgue measure of land. A corollary
follows: As the number of agents tends to innity, the set of agents who own a
parcel of positive Lebesgue measure of land shrinks to zero. The basic question is
this: Under what circumstances, if any, can we reconcile the two models? The
literature proceeds with Papageorgiou and Pines (1990), Asami, Fujita and Smith
(1991), Berliant (1991), Berliant and ten Raa (1991), Kamecke (1993), and Berliant
and Sabarwal (2008). McLean and Meunch (1981) to a certain degree anticipate the
controversy. Berliant and Sabarwal (henceforth BS) show that, in the versions of
the discrete and continuous models used below, an empirically relevant comparative
static di¤ers in the two types of models.
In this note, we compare equilibrium price and population densities of the linear
(one dimensional) monocentric city models for a continuum of agents and a nite
number of agents. The models will feature the same utility functions and endowments
for all consumers. The nite model and the continuum model will have the same
number of consumers. In the nite model this is the actual integer number. In
the continuum model, this is interpreted as the (Lebesgue) measure of consumers on
the real line. There is an absentee landlord. The city boundary is endogenous, and
determined by agricultural land rent.
We note that as population goes to innity, in both models per capita land con-
sumption tends to zero whereas land prices tend to innity.
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This note is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and analyzes the contin-
uous agent model. Section 3 does the same for the discrete agent model. Section 4
graphs the equilibrium prices for the two models for comparison. Section 5 presents a
regression assuming that the discrete agent model is the true model that is estimated
by a continuous agent model. Section 6 compares equilibrium population distribu-
tions of the two models. Finally, section 7 provides our conclusions and directions
for future research.
2 The Continuous Agent Model
2.1 Notation
Here we introduce a canonical model of urban residential location. Interpretation
and explanation can be found in Fujita (1989).
r Distance from CBD
z Consumption of composite commodity
s Land consumption
t Per kilometer commuting cost
w Endowment of composite good per capita
u(s; z) Utility function
N Measure of consumers (exogenous)
n(r) Density of consumers (per kilometer)
r City boundary (endogenous)
u Utility level (endogenous)
p(r) Per unit rent at distance r from the CBD (endogenous)
1 Agricultural land rent (exogenous)
1 Land supply density (exogenous)
2.2 Equilibrium
Take u(s; z) = z+ln(s). This is classic, as the resulting rent gradient (derived below)
is often used for empirical estimation; see for example Mills (1972, p. 247, Table 1).
Quasi-linear utility is useful for solving the nite model explicitly. Typically, we
would have to solve the nite model numerically if we dont have quasi-linearity.
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Consumer optimization problem:
max
z;s
z + ln(s)
subject to:
z + p(r)  s+ r  t = w
Substituting the budget into the objective function,
max
s
w   p(r)  s  r  t+ ln(s)
p(r)  s(r) = 1
z(r) = w   p(r)  s(r)  r  t = w   1  r  t
ln(s(r)) = u  z(r) = u  w + 1 + r  t
s(r) = exp(u  w + 1)  exp(r  t)
p(r) = n(r) =
1
s(r)
= exp(w   1  u)  exp( r  t) (1)
Moreover, we know that rent at the urban boundary must be 1:
p(r) = 1 = exp(w   1  u)  exp( r  t)
Hence,
exp(w   1  u) = exp(r  t)
Next,
N =
Z r
0
n(r)dr
= exp(w   1  u) 
Z r
0
exp( r  t)dr
= exp(w   1  u) 
"
 
1
t
exp( r  t)
r
0
#
= exp(w   1  u) 
1
t
[1  exp( r  t)]
Therefore,
exp(w   1  u) =
Nt
1  exp( r  t)
and
p(r) =
Nt
1  exp( r  t)
 exp( r  t)
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Since p(r) = 1,
1 =
Nt
1  exp( r  t)
 exp( r  t)
1  exp( r  t) = exp( r  t)Nt
1 = exp( r  t) [Nt+ 1]
r =
ln(Nt+ 1)
t
Therefore,
p(r) = exp( rt) [Nt+ 1]
For later use, note that:
ln[p(r)] = ln(Nt+ 1)  rt (2)
3 The Discrete Agent Model
3.1 An Important Note
There is an apparent discrepancy between the equilibrium land price functions in
Berliant and Fujita (1992) (henceforth BF) and Berliant and Sabarwal (2008). In
BF, the equations of importance are (4.12) and (4.15), (4.37), (4.39b), (4.41), (4.42),
(5.4), and (5.5). In BS, the equation for the price density is given in the short section
2.3, p. 441.
In BF heterogeneity in consumer endowments or wealth, and hence in equilibrium
utility levels, is allowed whereas in BS it isnt. In BF, the reason we include the term
f 1i (x) in the price density, and consequently
Pi
j=2 "j on the expenditure side of the
budget constraint is to prevent discrete moves by poorer consumers from the parcels
closer to the CBD to parcels farther from the CBD. These are not marginal but
discrete moves, so they cant be accounted for using rst order conditions. In BS,
there is no such issue, since consumers moving farther out will, after satisfying rst
order conditions for optimization subject to the budget, consume the same bundle
as one of their twins, and achieve the same utility level. What happens in BF is
that if we used the price density from BS, a poor consumer might nd a subset of a
wealthier consumers parcel better. To deter them, we must make prices in outlying
parcels higher. This is of particular importance when utility is not quasi-linear.
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The bottom line is that both equilibrium price densities are correct. There are
multiple equilibrium price densities in this model. The price density in BS is simpler
because all consumers are assumed to be identical. In BS, the equilibrium found is
best for consumers and worst for the landlord. The equilibria constructed in BF are
generally worse than this one for the consumers. Also note that the results in BF do
not apply to quasi-linear utility because the boundary condition used in BF (called
Assumption 1 there) is not satised.
After introducing the notation for the nite model, we shall verify that in the
case of log-linear utility used in this note, the equilibrium utility levels achieved by
consumers for the price density proposed by BS are indeed identical.
3.2 Notation
We will use analogous notation for the nite model. There are just a few alterations.
First, the number of consumers is N , an integer. Second, we index bundles (si; zi)
by consumer i = 1; 2; :::; N , where consumers (who are ex ante identical) are ordered
from the CBD outward. Finally, we call the price density for this model P (r) to
distinguish it from the continuum of agents model.
3.3 Equilibrium
With quasi-linear utility, its easiest to solve for the equilibrium parcels rst. The
rst order conditions for the model with nitely many agents yield:1
1
si
= 1 + (N   i)  t
si =
1
1 + (N   i)  t
(3)
The price density P (r) can be dened as follows. For consumer 1, the consumer
closest to the CBD with the smallest parcel, the price density is (N   1)t+ 1. This
applies for r such that 1
r
 (N   1)t + 1 or 0  r  1
(N 1)t+1
. Then, u(s1; z1) =
w   1  ln(1 + (N   1)  t).
1This calculation is obviously not as easy with, say, Cobb-Douglas utility.
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For consumer 2, P (r) is dened as follows. For r with 1
(N 2)t+1
 r  1
(N 1)t+1
,
P (r) = 1
r
. For r with 1
(N 2)t+1
 r  1
(N 1)t+1
+ 1
(N 2)t+1
, P (r) = (N  2)t+1. Then
u(s2; z2) = w  
t
(N   1)t+ 1
  ln(1 + (N   2)  t) 
Z 1
1+(N 1)t
+ 1
1+(N 2)t
1
1+(N 1)t
P (r)dr
= w  
t
(N   1)t+ 1
  ln(1 + (N   2)  t)
 
Z 1
(N 2)t+1
1
1+(N 1)t
1
r
dr  
Z 1
(N 1)t+1
+ 1
(N 2)t+1
1
(N 2)t+1
[(N   2)t+ 1] dr
= w  
t
(N   1)t+ 1
  ln(1 + (N   2)  t)
+ ln((N   2)t+ 1)  ln(1 + (N   1)  t) 
(N   2)t+ 1
(N   1)t+ 1
= w   1  ln(1 + (N   1)  t)
= u(s1; z1)
Thus, the equilibrium utility levels for consumers 1 and 2 are the same. Similar
calculations should apply for the other consumers, verifying the claim in Berliant and
Sabarwal (2008, p. 441) that this is an equilibrium for the nite model with identical
consumers for this particular functional form of utility.2
Proceeding to compute the price density for all locations,3
P (r) =
8>><
>>:
(N   1)t+ 1 for 1
(N 1)t+1
 r  0
1
r 
Pi 2
j=1
1
1+(N j)t
for
Pi 2
j=1
1
(N j)t+1
+ 1
(N i)t+1
 r 
Pi 1
j=1
1
(N j)t+1
and i  2
(N   i)t+ 1 for
Pi
j=1
1
(N j)t+1
 r 
Pi 2
j=1
1
(N j)t+1
+ 1
(N i)t+1
and i  2
4 Price Graphs
Note that for the nite model, the price density P (r) must be dened piecewise,
segment by segment. This is quite labor intensive.
2There are likely other equilibria, with for example a non-constant price density for the rst
consumer. The one we examine appears to be the equilibrium that maximizes consumer utility and
minimizes landlord income among all equilibria.
3The slight di¤erences between this expression and the one in BS are a type-o in that paper
(s(s 
P
n 1
k=1
sk; u)) and the way we index consumers.
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Lets try N = 10, t = 1 to get things going. The graph of both the discrete agent
model land price density, P (r), and the continuous agent model land price density,
p(r), are given in Figure 1.
Notice that when more consumers are added by increasing N , due to the quasi-
linear utility function, the P (r) function is only modied from N = 1 leftward. That
is, P (r) is the same for i = 2; 3; :::; 10. What this means is that the graph is extended
to the left of r = 0, but remains almost the same as the graph below for r > 0. The
only di¤erence is in the rst consumer, who is special.
p(r) =
(
exp( r)  11 0  r  ln(11)
1 ln(11)  r
0 1 2 3 4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
r
p(r), P(r)
Figure 1: Price densities: p(r) for continuum model (black), P(r) for nite model
(red); t = 1
Now lets try t = 10. The land price densities are given in Figure 2.
p(r) =
(
exp( r  10)  101 0  r  ln(101)=10
1 ln(101)=10  r
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Figure 2: Price densities: p(r) for continuum model (black), P(r) for nite model
(red); t = 10
5 Regression
Since the model with a continuum of agents is often used empirically, here we analyze
the contrast between the two models. If the continuum model makes sense only when
there is a nite model nearby, we perform the following exercise. Suppose that the
true model is the nite one. We generate data using the nite model equilibrium.
Use the model with 10 consumers as illustrated in Figure 1. For each consumer
i, calculate the front location distance to their equilibrium parcel, called ri. Then
compute the average price on a parcel
pi =
R ri+si
ri
P (r)dr
si
There will be 10 data points. Then we run the regression implied for the continuum
equilibrium price gradient, (2). That is,
ln(pi) = ln(Nt+ 1)  ri  t+ "i
If the continuum model is a good approximation to the nite model, the constant
in this regression should be ln(11) = 2:3979, and the coe¢cient on ri should be  1.
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Front Location Average Price ln(Average Price)
0 10 2:3026
:1 9:0482 2:2026
:21111 8:0534 2:0861
:33611 7:0597 1:9544
:47897 6:0678 1:803
:64563 5:0783 1:625
:84563 4:0926 1:4092
1:0956 3:113 1:1356
1:429 2:1443 :76281
1:929 1:1931 :17655
In fact, the constant is 2:321991 with standard error :007885, whereas the re-
gression coe¢cient on ri is  1:09772 with standard error :008557. The regression
estimate of the nite model using the continuum model is thus:
p(r) = exp( r  1:09772)  10:196
Next, in Figure 3 we reproduce Figure 1 with the regression estimate:
0 1 2 3 4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
r
p(r), P(r)
Figure 3: Price densities: p(r) for continuum model (black), P(r) for nite model
(red), regression estimate of nite model (green); t = 1
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With this specication, namely using the front location for distance from the CBD
and the average price for the unit price of the parcel, and presuming that the nite
model is the true model, in other words it generates the data, we have the following
conclusions from the regression. The unit commuting cost is overestimated relative
to both the nite model and the continuum model. The intercept (unit price of
land at the CBD) is underestimated. Therefore, if the continuum model is used
empirically, it will generate biased estimates.
An alternative would be to generate locations randomly and use the best t of the
continuum model to the nite model. But this makes little sense, since one is not
likely to observe prices at di¤erent points of the same parcel. Moreover, sampling
will be more frequent for larger parcels.
6 Population Graph
We will graph the cumulative population at distance r from the CBD. For the
continuous population model, with our functional form, we can explicitly compute
from (1) its integral, namely the cumulative population distribution in the case N =
10, t = 1: Z r0
0
n(r)dr = 11  11 exp( r0)
For the discrete model, we cumulate agents at the back ends of their parcels. For
this purpose, we utilize (3), and call the cumulative N(r). Figure 4 illustrates the
cumulative population as a function of distance from the CBD.
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r
Cumulative Population
Figure 4: Cumulative population:
R
n(r)dr for continuum model (black), N(r) for
nite model (red); t = 1
It is obvious that deviations between the models get larger farther from the CBD.
7 Conclusions
There are several implications of this exercise:
1. The overall t is not bad, but there are a few very important caveats.
2. Its not clear which parameters are crucial for this exercise. We have examined
only t = 1 and t = 10, using log quasi-linear utility. It might be interesting to
multiply ln(s) in the utility function by a constant.
3. It would be of interest to use Cobb-Douglas to introduce income e¤ects, but this
is hard computationally. The level of utility and land consumption are more
di¢cult to solve in the nite model. We could perhaps use another quasi-linear
utility, but the character of the solutions will likely not change.
4. Its not clear that increasing N would do much in this context of quasi-linear
utility. For the nite model, things would appear to be more or less the
same, with more consumer land consumption added below location 0. For
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the continuum model, only the constant attached to the price changes. This
suggests that the approximation will not get better or worse as N
increases, in the sense that per-consumer error will be constant.
5. But it is of interest to explore the comparison between the two models as N
increases from 10 to 20 to 100. An important issue is if we make N
very large, then per capita land consumption will necessarily be close
to 0, whereas prices will be very large. In other words, can N be
made large enough so that the models are similar, but so that land
consumption is not ridiculously small? This seems to depend on the
choice of units.
6. How should the model be calibrated, namely how should parameters be chosen?
That will also depend on the choice of units.
7. As is obvious from the gures, if we use the same parameters for both the
continuum and discrete models, the continuum model has higher equilibrium
prices closer to the CBD, whereas the nite model has equilibrium prices higher
farther from the CBD. Since the discrete model is not self-contradictory, we can
infer a bias in results derived from the continuum model, such as comparative
statics.
8. Consider the nite model to be the truth, and the continuum model to be
the approximation. Then, there appears to be a systematic bias in
the continuum model estimate of the nite model price. Specically,
empirical estimates of the rent gradient from the continuum model are biased
upward relative to the value inserted into the nite model. Can this be proved
generally?
9. How should the bias be corrected?
10. The cumulative population distributions for the two models also diverge as the
distance from the CBD increases.
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